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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and
and through its
ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
JOHN E. PAPANIKOLAS, GUS
E. PAPANIKOLAS and NICK
E. PAPANIKOLAS, dba
MAGNA INVESTMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
a partnership,
Defendants, Respondents
and Cross-Appellants.

Case No.
10,657

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Condemnation action to acquire real property
owned by defendants in the vicinity of 4500 South
and 200 West Streets in Salt Lake County, Utah
for use in the construction of a public highway facility known as 45th South from U.S. 91 to I-15.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
By written Stipulation the parties agreed upon
the sum of $50,000.00 (which includes all interest,
costs, etc.) as the amount of compensation to be
1

paid defendants for the lands, buildings and improvements taken and for the damages to the remainder of defendants' property not taken, excluding only certain i terns of property claimed by defendants to be fixtures and compensable. Therefore,
the only issues tried in the lower court, sitting without a jury, were
Whether certain items of defendants'
property were fixtures and, if so,
1.

2. Whether defendants were entitled to
compensation therefor, either as a part of the
real property taken or as a damage to the
remainder of defendants' real property not
taken.
The trial court found that all of the items of
property in issue were fixtures and as such were a
permanent part of the real property upon which
they were situated. (R. 65). Detailed Findings Of
Fact were made and entered by the trial court as
to each i tern of property in issue ( R. 67-7 4, incl.).
It concluded that defendants were entitled to compensation for all such items of property situated
within the area taken, less the salvage value of those
items of property or parts thereof removed by defendants from the area taken (R. 74-75). It further
concluded that defendants were not entitled to compensation for the items of property situated outside the area taken because the law does not specifically provide for compensation therefor, and in
2

any event any damage thereto was speculative and
indefinite as to the nature, extent and amount
thereof ( R. 75) .
The trial court then awarded judgment to defendants in the sum of $103,731.00, of which
$53,731.00 was awarded as compensation for the
items of property situated within the area taken
after deducting therefrom the salvage value of those
items or parts thereof removed by defendants from
the area taken (R. 76-77). The sum of $50,000.00
has been paid to defendants and a partial satisfaction of the judgment in that amount has been filed
and entered (R. 78-79). Payment of the remaining
sum of $53,731.00 has been withheld pending this
appeal. Thereupon plaintiff filed its Notice Of
Appeal (R. 80) and defendants have cross-appealed
(R. 88-89).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plain tiff seeks reversal of that portion of the
judgment awarding the defendants the sum of
$53, 731.00 for the items of property found to be
fixtures, and seeks judgment in its favor as a matter of law or, that failing, for a modification of the
judgment to exclude therefrom the sum of $2,542.00
awarded to defendants for certain items of property which as a matter of law are not fixtures and
are non-compensable.
3

STATEMENT OF FACT
Defendants owned a tract of land fronting on
the then existing 4500 South Street on the north
side thereof between West Temple and 200 West
Streets in Salt Lake County, upon which there were
situated a complex of buildings containing machinery, equipment and facilities used by defendants
in conducting the business of precutting and prefabricating house components used in the construction of houses (Exh. A-1 attached to Complaint, Exh.
D-1, Tr. 9, 11, 12). On March 20, 1963 plaintiff
filed this action to condemn in fee, and for a temporary easement, a part of defendants' real property for the construction of a public highway facility known generally as 45th South from U.S. 91
to I-15 (Complaint and attached Exh. A-2, R. 1-8
incl.). Service of process on these defendants was
on March 22, 1963, being the date of taking (R. 16,
Tr. 2). The real property taken comprised the southern portion of the defendants' property upon which
were situated all of defendants' buildings except
that defendants' mill component building was severed by the "take" line. The south 43 feet of the
mill component building was located within the
area taken and the north 93 feet thereof was located
outside of the area taken (Exh. D-1). The complex
of buildings housed the i terns of property in dispute (Exh. D-1).
4

On March 27, 1963 an Order Of Immediate Occupancy of the property condemned was entered by
the lower court (R. 17-18). Thereafter demolition
crews razed the buildings situated within the area
taken, although prior thereto some of the items of
property in dispute, or parts thereof, were removed
therefrom by defendants. The remainder of the
mill component building was then enclosed on the
south side by constructing a completely new wall
just north of the "take" line.
To facilitate the trial of this case and to narrow the issues to be tried, the parties stipulated
( R. 60-64, incl.) as follows:
1. The sum of $50,000.00 (which
includes all interest and costs, etc.) as the
amount of compensation to be paid defendants for their lands, buildings and improvements taken and for the damages to the remainder of the defendants' property not taken, excluding therefrom all of the defendants'
property and property right to certain articles
set forth in Exhibits "A" and "D" attached
to defendants' answers dated April 22, 1966
to plaintiff's Interrogatories dated March 30,
1966 on file herein (R. 43-54, incl., 58-59).
2. The only remaining issues to be tried
to the court, sitting without a jury, were
5

(a) whether the i terns of property
set forth in said Exhibit "A" and Exhibit "D" were fixtures, and, if so,
(b) whether defendants are entitled to compensation therefor either as
a part of the real property taken as to
the items set forth in said Exhibit "A"
or as a damage to the remainder of defendants' real property not taken as to
the items set forth in said Exhibit "D".
3. The value stated as to each item set
forth in said Exhibit "A", all being within
the area taken ( Exh. "B" attached to defendants' answer to Interrogatories, R. 55)
was the fair market value as of March 22,
1963 thereof (R. 63, Tr. 96) and if found to
be compensable would enhance the value of
the realty in such amounts (Tr. 95).

4. That as to Items 34, 37, 39 and 40
set forth in said Exhibit "D" (not within the
area taken) the respective amounts set forth
therein are the reasonable cost of relocation
(Tr.5).
As to all items in dispute located within the
area taken as set forth in said Exhibit "A" (R. 4354, incl.). defendants were put to their proof as to
whether such items were fixtures and, if so, whether
compensable in this action. As to all items in dispute located outside of the area taken as set forth
6

in said Exhibit "D" (R. 58-59), defendants were
put to their proof as to whether such items were
fixtures, whether such items had been "damaged"
and the amount of damages, if any, thereto.
The trial court found that all of those items of
property in dispute as set forth in said Exhibit "A"
( R. 43-54, incl.) were physically attached and annexed to the realty taken (R. 67-71 incl.); that the
manner in which all of such items were so attached
and annexed to the realty taken and the manner in
which the same were adapted to the buildings to
which they were attached was such that the items
were intended to be and did become a permanent
part of the realty; that the realty was enhanced
thereby; that none of the items, except for the parts
thereof removed by defendants, could be removed
without substantial damage to the buildings to which
such items were attached or without substantial
damage to the item itself; and that by reason thereof all such items were fixtures (R. 71-72). Substantially the same findings were made as to the
items of property in dispute as set forth in Exhibit
"D" (R. 58-59) located within the remainder of
the mill component building not taken by plaintiff
(R. 73-7 4).
The trial court further found that fourteen separate items comprising a component part or the
whole of Items Nos. 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20,
21, 22, 23, 24 and 29 set forth in Exhibit "A" were
7

removed by defendants from the area taken, hav·
ing a salvage value of $2,665.00 (R. 72). It then
found that the reasonable value of the electrical
system and pneumatic power system located in the
remainder of the mill component building not taken
was $1,335.00 (R. 72-73). It then deducted the
salvage value of the items or components removed
( $2,665.00) and the reasonable value of that portion of the electrical and pneumatic systems not
taken ( $1,335.00), i.e. $4,000.00, from the total
sum of $57,731.00 and awarded defendants the sum
of $53,731.00 as compensation for the items of property within the area taken (R. 75, 77).
The trial court then found that the items of
property set forth in said Exhibit "D" (R. 58-59)
annexed and attached to the remainder of the mill
component building not taken had not been damaged by reason of the taking in this case ( R. 74)
and concluded that no damages should be awarded
to defendants therefor ( R. 75) .
ARGUMENT
Except for the following items, to-wit:
Item No. 9-Swing cut saw (R. 69)
Item No. 11-Compressor and circulator
(R. 69)
Item No. 13-Molding cut-off saw ( R. 69)
Item No. 17-Self-feed variable speed rip
saw (R. 70)
8

Item No. 20-Drill Press (R. 70)
Item No. 22-Continuous feed belt sander
(R. 70)
Item No. 29-6 inch jointer ( R. 71)
plaintiff does not contest the Findings Of Fact of
the trial court since plaintiff concedes that, with
the exceptions noted, the evidence supports the same.
Plaintiff does, however, contest the compensability
in condemnation of all of the items in dispute.
As to the i terns excepted and noted above, plaintiff contests the Findings Of Fact thereon and contends that by reason of their removal such are not
fixtures as a matter of law and likewise are not
compensable in condemnation.
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS JUDGMENT
AWARDING COMPENSATION TO DEFENDANTS FOR
THE ITEMS OF PROPERTY IN DISPUTE UNDER ITS
FINDINGS THAT SUCH WERE FIXTURES AND A
PERMANENT PART OF THE REALTY TAKEN BY
PLAINTIFF IN THE CONDEMN A TI ON OF DEFENDANTS' PREMISES.

The basis of plaintiff's argument is two-fold:
1. Section 78-34-10, Utah Code Annotated
1.953 does not expressly provide for compensation to
be paid for fixtures in a condemnation action, and
2. If fixtures are compensable, the trial court
e1Ted as a matter of law in finding that certain
items removed by defendants from the condemned
premises were fixtures, and likewise erred as a
9

matter of law in awarding any compensation therefor.
As to ( 1), the compensability for fixtures in
condemnation cases has not been expressly decided
by this court and the issue here presented is one of
first impression in Utah so far as our research
discloses. Accordingly, we are here seeking precedent not only to settle the issue as to the instant
case but to adopt standards and establish guide line
from which condemnors and condemnees alike might
ascertain what property rights must be compensated for in property known to the law as fixtures.
It is elementary that the power of eminent do-

main, being an inherent attribute of sovereignty,
exists in absolute and unlimited form. Nichols on
Eminent Domain, Volume 1, Section 1.13 ( 4), page
12; Section 1.14, 1.14(2), pages 13-16, inclusive;
Section 1.3, page 50. Article I, Section 22, Constitution of Utah is but a limitation upon the power
already in existence which would otherwise be unlimited. Nichols on Eminent Domain, Volume 1,
Section 1.3, pages 50-51. With such limitation having been imposed by our State Constitution it is
settled law that when private property is taken by
eminent domain the owner of the property is constitutionally entitled to compensation therefor. Nichols on Eminent Domain, Volume 3, Section 8.102),
page 6 and cases cited therein, including State v.
Noble, 6 Utah (2d) 40, 305 Pac. (2d) 495 (1957).
10

However, compensation is limited to those elements
expressly enumerated in Section 78-34-10, Utah Code
Annotated 1953. Likewise compensation must be
assessed in the manner therein provided for. Southern Pacific Company v. Arthur, 10 Utah (2d) 306,
352 Pac. ( 2d) 693 ( 1960). Applicable here is subdivision ( 1) thereof, to-wit:
" ( 1) The value of the property sought
to be condemned and all improvements thereon appertaining to the realty, and of each
and every separate estate or interest therein;
and if it consists of different parcels, the
value of each parcel and of each estate or
interest therein shall be separately assessed."
In construing the foregoing statute in Utah
Road Commission v. Hansen, 14 Utah (2d) 305,
383 Pac. ( 2d) 917 ( 1963) this court clearly decided that the foregoing statute does not allow compensation for personal property situated upon the
property taken. Thus, on page 308 of the Utah Reports it is noted that the foregoing statute
" ... speaks in terms of real property and
the damage to be awarded for its taking, but
contains no express wording construable as
allowing recovery for the cost of removing or
disposing of personal property from the premises condemned. The question of its disposition has been before the courts many times
and the majority view seems to be that, inasmuch as the condemnor takes only the realty, and acquires no interest in the personalty,
it is the responsibility of the condemnee as
owner to take care of his personal property
11

if he desires to preserve it; and that consequently the expenses in connection with its removal or sale are not proper to be considered
as a separate element of damages to be charged against the condemnor for the taking of
real property."
The crux of the matter is whether fixtures are non
compensable because not expressly provided for under Section 78-84-10, Utah Code Annotated 1.958
and, therefore, excluded under the rationale of Utah
Road Cornmission v. Hansen, supra, applicable to
personal property or whether fixtures come within
the description of "improvements thereon appertaining to the realty". We have been unable to find
any Utah case decisive on this point. Looking to
other jurisdictions, our research discloses that the
following states have specifically allowed compensation for fixtures in condemnation cases, to-wit:
Arkansas - Kansas City S.R. Co. v. Anderson, 113 S.W. 1030 (1908);
California - Los Angeles v. Klinker, 25
Pac. (2d) 826 (1933);
Connecticut - Jones v. New Haven Redevelopnient Agency, 146 A. (2d) 921
(1958);

Delaware - Roffman v. Wilrnington
Housing A iithority, 179 A. ( 2d) 99 ( 1962) ;
Georgia (1895);

Pause v. Atlanta, 26 S.E. 489
12

Illinois - Chicago S.F. & C.R. Co. v.
Ward, 18 N.E. 828, 21 N.E. 562 (1889);
Indiana - White v. Cincinnati R & MR
Co., 71N.E.276 (1904);
Kansas Hoy v. Kansas Turnpike
Authority, 334 P. (2d) 315 (1959);
Louisiana 350 (1961);
Maryland Atl. 522 ( 1919) ;

State v. Allen, 135 S. (2d)
Baltimore v. Himmel, 107

Massachusetts N.E. 115 (1897);

Williams v. Com., 47

Michigan - In re Slum Clearance, 52
N.W. (2d) 195 (1952);
Missouri - State v. Dockery, 300 S.W.
(2d) 450 (1957);
Montana - State v. Peterson, 328 P.
(2d) 617 ( 1958);
New Jersey (2d) 401 (1964);

State v. Gallant, 202 Atl.

New Hampshire - Edgcomb Steel of
New England v. State, 131 A. (2d) 70 (1957)
(Dictum);
New York - Re Psychopathic Pavilion,
230 N.Y. Supp. 411 (1928); and Jackson v.
State, 106 N.E. 758 (1914);
13

Ohio - State v. DeLay, 181 N.E. (2d)
706 (1959);
Oklahoma - Wright v. State, 230 Pac.
(2d) 462 (1951);
Oregon - State v. Superbilt Mfg. Co.,
281Pac. (2d) 707 (1955);
Pennsylvania - Diamond Mills Emery
Company v. Philadelphia, 22 Pa. Co. Ct. 9
(1894);
Tennessee 194 s.w. 903.

Yates & D. Co. v. Memphis,

Likewise Nichols on Eminent Domain states the rule
as a1lowing compensation for fixtures in condemnation cases. Volume 2, Section 5.83, 5.81 (11), pages
326-332, inclusive; Volume 4, Sections 13.12,
13.12(1) and 13.12(2), pages 364-368, inclusive.
In reaching the above result most of the states
have applied the general three-way test for determining whether the items in question are fixtures,
i.e. ( 1) the manner in which the item is attached
or annexed to the realty, (2) whether the item is
adaptable to the particular use of the realty and
(3) the intention of the annexor to make the item
a permanent part of the realty. Utah has applied
the same three-way test in non condemnation cases.

Heiselt Construction Company v. Garff,
119 Utah 164, 225 Pac. (2d) 720 (1950);
14

Saunders v. Kidman, 75 Utah 303, 284
Pac. 997 ( 1930) ;
Workman v. Henrie, 71 Utah 400, 266
Pac. 1033 (1928);
Moe v. Millard County School District,
54Utah144, 179 Pac. 980 (1919);
Calder's Park Company v. Corless, 51
Utah 586, 172 Pac. 310 ( 1918) ;
Miller v. Johnson, 43 Utah 468, 134 Pac.
1017 ( 1913) ;
Couch v. Welsh, 24 Utah 36, 66 Pac. 600
(1901);
4

Podlech v. Phelan, 13 Utah 333, 44 Pac.
838 (1896).

"'

'

Insofar as our le search discloses, none of our
sister states which have passed on the question of
compensability of fixtures in condemnation cases
has denied compensation. Although the decisions of
our sister states are pursuasive, they are not controlling. Compensability or non-compensability of
fixtures in condemnation cases in Utah is still open
for decision. Without belaboring the point, we ask
this court for a clear-cut decision thereon such that
condemnors and condemnees alike will know what
property rights, if any, must be compensated for
in property known to the law as fixtures.
15

Accordingly, if this court adopts the view that
fixtures are not compensable in condemnation cases
that should end this matter and the judgment of the
trial court awarding defendants the sum of $53,731.00 must be reversed. If, however, this court
adopts the view that fixtures are compensable then,
as noted ear lier under ( 2) above, the trial court
erred as a matter of law in finding that certain of
the items removed by defendants from the condemned premises were fixtures and likewise erred as a
matter of law in awarding any compensation therefor. Specifically the items about which the plaintiff
complains are as fallows:

Item No.

swing cut saw - located
in building "C" (Exh. D-1). It was bolted to
the wall (Tr. 28) but could be removed and
put some other place (Tr. 29), and was in
fact removed by simply taking off the bolts
and cover (Tr. 104). The fair market value
was fixed at $235.00 (R. 69) and its "salvage" value was fixed at $100.00 (R. 72) or
a difference of $135.00.
9 -

Item No. 11 - compressor and circulator

located within the paint spray room of
building "P" ( Exh.D-1). The circulator was
"attached" to the building (Tr. 30), comprising two heaters bolted to the wall (Tr. 108)
and "pots" containing lacquers and thinners
(Tr. 105) which were removed from the paint
16

area (Tr. 105, 108). The fair market value
thereof was $690.00 (Tr. 105) and the trial
court fixed its "salvage" value at $300.00
(R. 72) or a difference of $390.00.

Item No. 13 - Cut off saw - attached
to building "M" ( Exhs. D-1, D-3). It was bolted to the wall (Tr. 32) and was removed
(Tr. 95, 110). Its fair market value was
fixed at $232.00 (R. 69) and its "salvage"
value was fixed at $100.00 (R. 72) or a difference of $132.00.
Item No. 17 - Self feed variable speed
rip saw - located in component mill building (Exhs. D-1, D-4). It was bolted to a special base under the floor (Tr. 38) but was
removed and remounted in back of the component mill building (Tr. 113). Its fair market value was fixed at $1,010.00 (R. 70) and
its "salvage" value was fixed at $400.00 (R.
72) or a difference of $610.00.
Item No. 20 - drill press - located in component mill building (Exhs. D-1, D-7). It
was bolted to the wall and to the floor (Tr.
44) and was removed (Tr. 96). Its fair market value was fixed at $250.00 (R. 70) and
its "salvage' value was fixed at $125.00 (R.
72) or a difference of $125.00.
Item No. 22 - continuous feed belt sander
- located in component mill building (Exh.
17

D-1). It was bolted to the floor (Tr. 46) and
was removed (Tr. 96). Its fair market value
was fixed at $1,400.00 (R. 70) and its "salvage" value was fixed at $350.00 (R. 72) or a
difference of $1,050.00.

Item No. 29 - 6 inch jointer - located
in component mill building ( Exh. D-1). It
weighed about 200 pounds and was bolted to
the floor for the purpose of steadying it and
was removed (Tr. 124). Its fair market value
was fixed at $350.00 (R. 71) and its "salvage" value was fixed at $250.00 (R. 72) or
a difference of $100.00.
Summarizing the above, the fair market value,
"salvage" value and difference between them are as
follows:
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item
Item

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

9

11

13
17
20
22
29

Fair Market
Value

"Salvage"
Value

$ 235.00
690.00
232.00
1,010.00
250.00
1,400.00
350.00

$ 100.00
300.00
100.00
400.00
125.00
350.00
250.00

$ 135.00

$4,167.00

$1,625.00

$2,542.00

Difference

390.00
132.00
610.00
125.00
1,050.00
100.00

As to the above, the trial court found that
none of the items numbered 1 through 31 inclusive
18

" ... except for the parts thereof which were
?'enwved and salvaged by defendants as heremafter set forth, could be removed without
~ubstantial damage to the building to which
it was attached or without substantial damage to the item itself; ... " (R. 71-72) (Underscoring ours)

Thus the trial court found in effect that each of
the items listed above could be removed without substantial damage to the item itself. That being so,
we submit that it was error for the trial court to
award any compensation to defendants for any of
such items.
In a condemnation proceeding the mode of ennexation becomes the most important criteria of the
general three-way fixture test, i.e. ( 1) annexation,
( 2) adaption and ( 3) in ten ti on. It is the mode of
annexation which determines whether such items
constitute "improvements thereon appertaining to
the realty" and, therefore, compensable under Section 78-34-10(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953. Admittedly the criteria of intention plays the dominant
role in non-condemnation actions arising under our
lien statutes or in mortgagor-mortgagee, lessorlessee and vendor-vendee transactions for there the
relationships are contractual. Not so in condemnation proceedings. Here the parties are strangers.
And so the controlling factor is whether the annexation is such that the item can be removed without
substantial injury to the item itself and included,
but of lesser importance, whether removal will re19

sult in substantial injury to the realty. This is basically the test of compensability adopted in the District of Columbia and we submit the more realistic
test.
The landmark case is Futrovsky v. United
States, 66 Fed. (2d) 215 (C.A.D.C. 1933) where
that court held that machinery, some of which was
designed to fit the building, was bolted to the floor
but could have been removed without injury to the
machinery or to the building, except to perhaps deface the concrete floor, were not compensable in a
condemnation proceeding. The court concluded that
such items of machinery were not fixtures because
such could be removed without substantial injury
to either the realty or to the items themselves and
because they were placed in the building as a necessity of the business carried on there and not as an
improvement to the real estate. This rule was followed in Potomac Electric Power Company v. United
States, 85 Fed. (2d) 243 (C.A.D.C. 1936).
The rationale of the foregoing test was discussed in 8 Southern California Law Review in a
note concerning the case of City of Los Angeles v.
The Times-Mirror Company, 25 Pac. (2d) 828
( 1933) where the city was held liable for the value
of the presses in the condemned building. It was
stated on page 56 of the note as fallows:
" ... It might be argued that the City was
rightfully compelled to pay for the building
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as well as for the land in condemnation proceedings, but that the municipality should
not have been compelled to become the purchaser of the presses and like equipment when
such could have been removed by the appellant
newspaper company and used at a new location. Such a situation can be remedied quite
readily by the application of a distinct rule
in the case of condemnation proceedings by
governmental bodies. It is submitted that the
rule applied in the recent case of Futrovsky
v. United States would be an adequate remedy. That case provides that in federal condemnation proceedings, where substantial injury will not be affected by removal of fixtures, they remain personalty and need not
be taken as part of the realty regarding liability therefor. Although subject to criticism,
a similar rule applied by all governmental
bodies would prevent such a result as in the
instant case."
Ostensibly the fore going test was adopted by the
trial court as shown by its Findings. However, it
failed to apply the same to the seven items about
which plaintiff complains.
We submit that the condemnor should not be
forced to purchase items of machinery and equipment which could be readily removed to a new site
for further use by the condemnee. In harmony
therewith is Nichols on Eminent Domain, Section
5.83, where on page 328 it is stated:
"There is no liability for machinery or
other fixtures attached only by screws or
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which can otherwise be readily removed, at
least in jurisdictions which allow no recovery
for the cost of removing personal property."
Cases cited in support thereof are: Jackson v. State,
145 N.Y. Supp. 131; New York Central, etc. R.R.
Co. v. Albany Steam Trap Company, 146 N.Y. Supp.
674; and City of Huron v. Jelgerhuis (N.D.), 97
N.W. (2d) 314.
No more reason exists for imposing an obligation to purchase such items on the condemnor than
to require it to purchase items of personal property
situated upon the condemned premises. The latter
was clearly rejected by this court in Utah Road Commission v. Hansen, 14 Utah (2d) 305, 383 Pac.
(2d) 917 (1963).
The items in question had their place upon the
condemned premises for the purpose of carrying
out defendants' business of construction of houses.
The mere fact that defendants removed the items in
question demonstrates that such items were mobile
in nature and adaptable to use at other locations.
The removal of such i terns in and of itself is evidence
that such were not fixtures and likewise were non
compensable. It would be anomolous indeed to award
compensation to a businessman-owner for every
piece of equipment and machinery which was merely an integral part of his business, since the condemnor would in truth be paying for the owner's
business which could be transferred to another location.
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For the trial court to give the plaintiff a credit
for the "salvage" value thereof does not remedy
the situation. On the contrary, plaintiff should not
be required to pay for such items at all. Accordingly, the judgment must be modified to reduce the
award to defendants by the amount of $2,542.00,
thereby allowing no compensation for I terns Nos.
9, 11, 13, 17, 20, 22 and 29 described above.
CONCLUSION
Compensability of fixtures in condemnation
proceedings has not been expressly decided by this
Court. All of our sister states which have passed
on this point have held fixtures to be compensable
and none have denied compensation.
Determinative of this issue in Utah is whether
fixtures come within the description of "improvements thereon appertaining to the reality" and thus
compensable under Section 78-34-10(1), Utah Code
Annotated 1953. Although the decisions of our sister
states are persuasive, they are not controlling and
the issue is still open for decision in Utah. Accordingly, we are here seeking precedent and ask this
Court for a clear-cut decision thereon, not only to
settle the issue in this case but to adopt standards
and establish guide lines such that condemnors and
condemnees alike will know what property rights,
if any, must be compensated for in property known
to the law as fixtures.
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If this Court adopts the view that fixtures are
not compensable in condemnation proceedings that
will end this matter and the judgment of the trial
court awarding defendants the sum of $53,731.00
must be reversed. If, however, this Court adopts
the view that fixtures are compensable then we urge
that the requisite mode of annexation must be such
that removal of the item will cause substantial damage to the item itself and to the realty to which it
was attached. Ostensibly this was the test adopted
by the trial court. However, it failed to apply such
test to seven of the items removed by defendants,
which it in effect found could be removed without
substantial damage to the item itself or to the realty,
and awarded compensation for their full fair market values respectively less a credit for their respective "salvage" values. In so doing the trial court
erred and the judgment must be modified to reduce the amount of the award by the sum of
$2,542.00, being the net amount awarded to defendants for the seven items about which plaintiff
complains.
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